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1. Introduction 
 
The existing research on the informativeness of insider transactions 
has reached an apparent consensus on several points. A key finding is that 
whilst there is information contained in the trades of insiders (principally 
executives), this information content is restricted to purchases and not to 
sales. The explanation for this asymmetry is that, in the case of purchases, 
executives have to make an actual investment in the stock, whereas a sale 
could be induced by a number of factors including a liquidity requirement or 
the need to diversify. 
A second finding to emerge from the literature is that there appears to 
be little information contained in the exercise of executive stock options. This 
is explained by the fact that the decision to exercise may be complicated by 
the inherent restrictions imposed on the executive by the option. These 
restrictions include a vesting period during which the option cannot be 
exercised, the inability to sell the option and an expiration date. In addition, it 
is generally argued that there is no rational reason for an executive to 
exercise an option and hold the stock acquired at exercise. If the executive 
sells the stock acquired, then it follows that it would be unreasonable to 
expect the transaction to be informative given the absence of an information 
content in standard sales. 
In contrast to this existing research, executives in the UK do not sell at 
exercise all the stock they acquire. The predominant reason for this is the tax 
regime in the UK, which during this period allowed executives to delay the tax 
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liability associated with the gains made at exercise until the stock was sold. 
This tax related incentive to hold the acquired stock means that an investment 
in stock via the exercise of an option should be relatively uninformative. In 
contrast, a decision to exercise and sell should be much more informative.  
In view of the distinction between purchases and sales and the 
predictive content they have for subsequent returns, we similarly distinguish 
between option-related transactions that require the executive to make an 
actual investment in the stock, and those that generate an income. Consistent 
with this, we find that there is little predictive ability over subsequent returns 
where the transaction is one that is classified as being an investment, i.e. 
where an executive decides to exercise and hold. Despite the transaction 
requiring the executive to make a net investment in the stock, the tax 
incentive to hold the stock acquired means that there is little information 
contained in these trades. However, we find that a transaction generating 
revenue for the executive (an exercise and sell) has significant predictive 
ability for subsequent returns, implying that these trades also have a 
significant information content. Finally, by distinguishing between the relative 
size of the transactions, we are able to show that their predictive ability is not 
uniformly related to their size.  One explanation for this is the notion of stealth 
trading, i.e. insiders who are trading on information attempt to disguise this by 
trading smaller blocks of shares. Perhaps a more likely explanation for this, 
however, is that where trades can be classified as being discretionary, they 
will be significantly more informative than those that may be motivated by 
liquidity considerations. 
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As a result, we conclude that not only are stock option exercises by 
executives able to predict subsequent stock returns, but there is an 
asymmetry in this predictive ability that is the reverse of that observed for 
standard insider transactions. This suggests that tax and other factors may be 
important in determining whether trades are likely to have predictive ability for 
future stock returns, rather than simply whether the trade generates revenue 
or requires an investment.    
 
2. Literature 
 
The literature relating to insider transactions has been motivated 
principally by the desire to investigate market efficiency. Ever since Fama 
(1970) distinguished between different levels of efficiency depending on the 
type of information that is incorporated into prices, researchers have 
attempted to isolate those individuals who are likely to have information that is 
not in the public domain. In addition, there is the interest in determining the 
profitability of a strategy that mimics the trades of insiders. As a result, a 
number of academics have examined the stock price reaction to, and hence 
the predictive ability of, insider trades. Much of this research has focused on 
the US, and includes studies by Jaffe (1974), Finnerty (1976), Givoly and 
Palman (1985), Seyhun (1986, 1988, 1992), Rozeff and Zaman (1988), Pettit 
and Venkaatesh (1995) and Eckbo and Smith (1998). Whilst this early 
research suggested that both purchases and sales by insiders had predictive 
ability, more recent research by Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser (2000) and 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) has concluded that only insider purchases have 
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predictive ability for future stock returns. Furthermore, this predictive ability is 
fairly limited, being evident only for insiders within the smaller firms. Research 
conducted in the UK has reached a similar conclusion. This includes studies 
by King and Roell (1988), Pope, Morris and Peel (1990), Gregory, Matatko, 
Tonks and Purkis (1994), and Gregory, Matatko and Tonks (1997). The most 
recent research by Friederich, Gregory, Matatko and Tonks (2002) (albeit 
focusing on relatively short time horizons after the transaction), also 
concludes that purchases are more informative than sales. In addition, 
Friederich, Gregory, Matatko and Tonks (2002) find that executives purchase 
/ sell stock after significantly negative / positive abnormal returns during the 
20 days prior to the trade, indicating that they are adept at timing their trades 
to take advantage of short-term price movements. 
At the same time, academics have examined the predictive ability of 
insider trades in the form of the exercise of executive stock options. This 
research has been limited given the assumption that the exercise of executive 
stock options is unlikely to have predictive ability given the restrictions 
associated with them. Executive stock options cannot be sold, and in the UK 
are granted with a three-year vesting period during which they cannot be 
exercised. Furthermore, an option should not be exercised unless the 
executive intends to sell the acquired stock, since exercise requires the 
payment of the exercise price. Consistent with this, there is little evidence to 
indicate that the exercise of an executive stock option has predictive ability for 
future stock returns. Carpenter and Remmers (2001) find that in a regime in 
the US where executives are able to sell immediately the shares acquired at 
exercise, option exercise has predictive ability only when it is by the most 
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senior managers in small firms. The associated empirical research confirms 
these predictions relating to the exercise of stock options. Huddart and Lang 
(2003) find that option exercise by low ranked employees may have predictive 
ability for future returns, possibly because they face fewer restrictions 
regarding when they can trade. In addition, there is consistent evidence that 
option exercise is related to the performance of the stock prior to exercise. 
Huddart and Lang (1996) and Heath, Huddart and Lang (1999) find that 
employees’ option exercise decisions are positively related to previous short-
term stock returns. In contrast, there is no evidence in the UK that option-
related trades have predictive ability for future stock returns (see, for example, 
Gregory, Matatko, Tonks and Purkis (1994)), or are related to previous stock 
returns. 
The resulting implication, that liquidity or expiration rather than 
information appear to drive the majority of transactions involving the exercise 
of executive stock options, is complicated in the UK by the framework within 
which options are granted. Firstly, the guidelines developed by the 
Association of British Insurers (one of two associations that represent 
institutional shareholders) impose a limit on options held of four times the 
executive’s pay. This limit, which Main (1999) states has been followed 
closely by firms in the UK, gives executives a powerful incentive to exercise 
irrespective of their expectations about their firm’s stock. Secondly, during the 
period of this study, the tax regime in the UK provides executives with a 
strong motive to hold the stock acquired at exercise. The reason for this is 
that the gain made at exercise incurs a tax liability only when the stock is sold. 
These two factors combine to encourage executives in the UK to exercise and 
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hold the acquired stock. As a result, a decision to exercise and sell is more 
likely to be taken if the executive has negative information about the stock.  
The evidence that purchases have much greater predictive ability than 
sales for future stock returns is explained by the fact that they are less likely to 
be driven by liquidity. This paper extends this distinction between insiders’ 
transactions (on the basis of whether they generate revenue or require an 
investment) to option-related trades. Specifically, we hypothesise that if such 
trades have predictive ability, then this should be reflected in the net 
transaction value at exercise. In addition, we would also expect the net 
transaction value to be related to previous short-term stock returns.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
 This study is based on data supplied by Directus Ltd for the period 
January 1992 – July 1998. Directus Ltd compile a complete record of all 
executive transactions that take place in the UK. This period yields a sample 
of 5779 exercises for which we have associated stock returns data, together 
with the exercise price at the time of exercise. Table 1 below presents 
additional summary statistics relating to our sample of exercises. In addition, 
we also present data on the two sub samples that we investigate, which we 
denote as Revenue and Invest. These are respectively transactions that 
generate net revenue, or require a net investment. The net transaction value 
is determined simply by the cost of exercise (as determined by the quantity 
exercised and the exercise price), and the value of the corresponding sale of 
stock. Only sales of stock that occur at the same time as the exercise are 
regarded as part of that particular transaction. Although it is possible that an 
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executive may subsequently sell additional stock, this possibility is 
disregarded as an analysis of our data indicates it to be rare.  
Table 1 
 Table 1 shows that the 5779 exercises within our sample relate to a 
total of 899 firms. Thus each firm has an average of just over 6 exercises. The 
average market capitalisation at exercise is £2.65bn. There is some evidence 
to suggest that the market capitalisation of firms where the executive makes a 
net investment is smaller than where the executive generates revenue from 
the transaction. Finally, the number of event days is the number of days 
during the period on which at least one exercise takes place. Given the 
respective number of exercises, it is clear that, for the sample as a whole, an 
average day will see approximately four stock option exercises.  
There are two features of our data that preclude the use of a standard 
event study methodology to test whether an event is associated with an 
abnormal stock return. These are the lack of independence in pre-event stock 
returns, and the event clustering illustrated by Table 1. The lack of 
independence in returns prior to the event arises because the nature of a 
stock option exercise means that each event must be related to previous 
stock returns. An option will only be exercised if it is in-the-money, i.e. if the 
current stock price exceeds the exercise price. As a result, it is unlikely that an 
exercise will be independent of a stock’s previous returns. Furthermore, a 
specific hypothesis that we wish to examine is whether the decision to 
exercise is driven by the stock’s immediate returns prior to that exercise. 
There is some evidence consistent with this for employee stock options (see, 
Huddart and Lang (1996) and Heath, Huddart and Lang (1999)). This lack of 
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independence means that the use of a market model to calculate abnormal 
returns around an exercise would not be appropriate.  
We overcome the bias that would be induced by the use of a market 
model by measuring abnormal returns through the use of a benchmark 
portfolio. The abnormal returns associated with each exercise are determined 
by the firm’s returns relative to the equally weighted returns to their size and 
momentum benchmark portfolio. At every event, or exercise, we sort all firms 
into forty benchmark portfolios. These benchmark portfolios are created by an 
initial sort into deciles based on market capitalisation, followed by a second 
sort by the previous year’s return (up to a month before exercise). Thus there 
are four momentum ranked portfolios for each size ranked decile, yielding 
forty portfolios in all. This approach is similar to that applied in Carpenter and 
Remmers (2001).1  
 The second issue noted above is the clustering of events that is 
evident in Table 1. This event clustering is likely to induce significant cross-
sectional dependence between the abnormal returns. A key assumption in 
                                                
1
 We adjust for size because of the strong evidence that size can be important in 
explaining the cross-section of average stock returns (see, for example, Fama and French 
(1992)), and is a common approach in the literature (see, for example, Loughran and Ritter 
(1995) and Esplenaub, Gregory and Tonks (2000)). We also adjust for momentum because of 
the consistent finding that stocks exhibit return persistence over the medium term (see, for 
example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Rouwenhorst (1998) and Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2001)). Adjusting for a momentum effect may be particularly important in our study because 
we expect the exercise decision to be influenced by previous stock returns. Moreover, Lyon, 
Barber and Tsai (1999) show that ignoring pre-event returns induces a bias in test statistics of 
abnormal returns that is positively related to the sign of the pre-event returns. They suggest 
that matching firms to benchmark portfolios sorted by pre-event return can control for this. 
 9
standard event study methodology is that these should be independent, and 
as a result, we are unable to aggregate the abnormal returns in event time. 
Such an approach would yield misspecified test statistics. We therefore use a 
calendar-time approach (see, for example, its application in Brav and 
Gompers (1997)), which Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) show is particularly 
suited to an analysis where cross-sectional dependence is induced by 
overlapping returns.2 
The calendar-time approach is based on determining an abnormal 
return for each calendar day. The abnormal return (ARit) associated with a 
particular day for any exercise is: 
( )ititit RERAR −= ,    (1) 
where Rit is the return for firm i on day t and E(Rit) is the firm’s expected 
return, given by the equally weighted return to its benchmark portfolio. From 
the abnormal returns to each exercise, we derive a time series of abnormal 
returns for a particular event window. For any event window, the abnormal 
return each day in calendar time (ARt) is the mean abnormal return to the 
portfolio of firms nt with an exercise in the preceding event period:  
=
=
tn
1i
it
t
t AR
n
1AR .    (2) 
Thus, for example, the abnormal return for the 1 month post-event 
window on day j is composed of the mean abnormal return to the portfolio of 
firms that had an exercise during the month prior to day j. The components of 
                                                
2
 Unfortunately, the calendar-time approach does not produce abnormal returns that would 
correspond precisely to those that would be experienced by investors following a strategy that 
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the portfolio of qualifying firms changes each day. The mean abnormal return 
(MAR) associated with a particular event window is simply the mean of the 
calendar time abnormal returns: 
=
=
T
1t
tART
1MAR ,    (3) 
where T is the total number of days within our sample. To test the null 
hypothesis that the mean abnormal return (MAR) for any given event window 
is zero, we use a t-statistic derived from the time series standard deviation of 
the abnormal returns σ(AR):  
( ) ( ) T/AR
MARMARt
tσ
= .   (4) 
 
4. Results 
 
As discussed above, we hypothesise that if the exercise of executive 
stock options has predictive ability for future stock returns, this predictive 
ability would be determined by the net value of the transaction. The existing 
research on standard transactions implies that this predictive ability will be 
greatest where an executive makes an investment, rather than where revenue 
is generated. However, we note that the framework within which options are 
granted suggests that executives have a strong incentive to exercise and hold 
(implying that they should make a net investment in the stock when they 
exercise). The obvious benefit associated with delaying the tax liability 
associated with the gain made at exercise means that a decision to generate 
                                                                                                                                       
mimicked the trades of the insiders. We find that the event-time abnormal returns are similar 
to those reported below, but the problem of misspecified test statistics remains. 
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revenue from an exercise by exercising and selling should have important 
implications for future stock returns. Specifically, we anticipate that revenue-
generating transactions imply negative future stock returns.  
In order to investigate this, we calculate the net transaction value 
associated with each exercise. This is simply the difference between the cost 
of exercising (exercise price times quantity of stock exercised) and the 
revenue generated by selling stock at the same time (stock price times 
quantity of stock sold). If the former exceeds the latter then the exercise is 
classified as requiring the executive to make an investment, whereas the 
reverse is a revenue-generating exercise. As shown in Table 1, of our sample 
of 5779 exercises, 2731 are revenue generating, whilst 3048 require an 
investment. As would be expected, the average revenue generated 
(£185,004) is considerably greater than the average investment made 
(£53,432). 
Previous research in the UK relating to standard executive transactions 
(Friederich, Gregory, Matatko and Tonks (2002)) has suggested that medium-
sized trades may be relatively more informative. We therefore similarly 
distinguish between net trades classified as small, medium and large, where a 
trade classified as medium is one generating revenue (or requiring 
investment) of £5,000 - £70,000. Table 2 presents the abnormal returns 
around exercises classified as requiring an investment, whilst Table 3 
presents the same for revenue-generating transactions. Both tables give the 
abnormal returns for that complete sample of transactions, together with the 
three subdivisions depending on the size of the transaction. 
Table 2  
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Table 3 
Table 2 shows that there is no evidence of significant post-event 
abnormal returns where the exercise and sell decision requires the executive 
to make a net investment. There is, however, some evidence that the decision 
to exercise is influenced by the previous returns experienced by the stock. 
These are small but significantly positive for the complete sample, as well as 
for the medium and large transactions. These results indicate that whilst these 
transactions have no predictive ability for future stock returns, the decision to 
exercise and invest in the stock may be related to previous stock returns, 
suggesting that executives time their exercises to capture short-term gains. 
This is a feature of exercise decisions that has been observed in respect of 
employee stock options in the US (see, for example, Heath, Huddart and 
Lang (1999)). 
In contrast to the investment-requiring transactions, the revenue-
generating transactions do appear to have strong predictive ability for future 
stock returns. In addition, the decision to exercise and generate revenue is 
strongly influenced by the previous stock returns over the month prior to 
exercise. For the complete sample, pre-exercise abnormal returns are 2.53% 
(t-statistic of 11.17). This pre-exercise abnormal return for revenue-generating 
transactions does not depend on the size of the transaction – we obtain 
returns of 2.59% and 2.54% for the Small and Large sub samples 
respectively. Post-exercise, revenue-generating transactions imply that future 
stock return performance will be poor. For the complete sample, we obtain 1 
month and 3 month abnormal returns of –0.63% (t-statistic of –2.41) and –
1.51% (t-statistic of –3.36). This result is consistent with the fact that 
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generating revenue at exercise will effectively bring forward a tax liability, and 
therefore such a transaction predicts subsequent negative abnormal returns.  
Table 3 also shows that this predictive ability is inversely related to the 
amount of revenue generated by the transaction. The Small sub sample yields 
significant abnormal returns over 1 and 3 months of –1.06% and –2.57%, 
whilst the Large sub sample yields insignificant abnormal returns over the 
same periods of just –0.29% and –1.09%. One view could be that these 
results reinforce the ‘stealth trading’ hypothesis supported by Friederich, 
Gregory, Matatko and Tonks (2002). They argue that medium value 
transactions are relatively more informative than large value ones because 
insiders attempt to disguise the fact that they are trading on information. An 
alternative view is that a transaction that generates a relatively small amount 
of income may indicate strong negative information because such a 
transaction is essentially discretionary. It is difficult to explain a decision to 
bring forward a tax liability by selling at exercise and generating a small 
amount of revenue as being driven by liquidity needs. As a result, such 
transactions are more likely to be informative than large value ones where the 
decision may be motivated by liquidity. It is unlikely that the impact of taxation 
can fully explain our results. Transactions that generate substantial net 
revenue (over £70,000) incur a correspondingly large tax liability. The 
willingness on the part of the executive to incur this, together with the absence 
of a predictive content, suggests that liquidity, or diversification, may be 
important factors motivating their exercise behaviour.  
This analysis of transaction value ignores the fact that the predictive 
ability of a transaction may be determined not just by its size, but by its size 
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relative to the size of the firm to which it relates. We examine this by 
measuring the revenue generated (or investment required) at exercise relative 
to the market capitalisation of the firm. The complete sample results are the 
same as before. The subdivisions into Small, Medium and Large are now 
arbitrarily defined to give three equally sized sub samples for both the 
revenue-generating and investment-requiring transactions.   
Table 4 
Table 5 
 The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 shows that there 
is now some evidence that where the executive makes a large investment 
relative to the size of the firm, subsequent abnormal returns are positive and 
significant over the 1 and 3 month periods – 1.17% (t-statistic of 3.44) and 
1.06% (t-statistic of 2.00) respectively. This is more in line with existing 
research relating to standard executive transactions. 
 The results in Table 5 are again similar to those in Table 3. There is 
some evidence that the relative amount of revenue executives generate at 
exercise is positively related to pre-exercise returns. 1 month pre-exercise 
abnormal returns are 1.78% for the Small sub sample and 3.79% for the 
Large sub sample. This indicates that the extent to which executives capture 
short-term gains is determined by the size of these gains. Despite this, the 
Small sample continues to yield consistently negative and significant post-
exercise abnormal returns. It is therefore clear that the predictive ability of 
revenue-generating transactions is being driven by the smaller transactions, 
whether this is measured in absolute terms (less than £5,000) or in relative 
terms to the size of the firm.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
These results contrast with those in the literature for standard 
executive transactions. The literature documents that purchases are more 
informative than sales because, it is argued, purchases require the executive 
to make an investment in the stock. We find no evidence to suggest that this 
is the case for executive stock option transactions. It is possible that the 
reason for the lack of predictive ability in transactions that require an 
investment is the tax regime that applies to the options exercised during this 
period. Executives only incur a tax liability on the gain they make at exercise 
when they sell the acquired stock, giving them a strong incentive to exercise 
and hold in order to delay this tax liability. 
The absence of predictive ability for investment-requiring transactions 
is in contrast to our findings in relation to the revenue-generating transactions. 
Here we find that executives exercise to capture short-term positive abnormal 
returns during the month prior to exercise. Post-exercise, these transactions 
have strong predictive ability for periods up to 6 months. An analysis of this 
according to the size of the transaction indicates that it is the smaller 
transactions that drive this predictive ability. We conclude that the larger 
transactions do not have predictive content because they are more likely to be 
driven by liquidity, or the need to diversify. These results are consistent with 
the existing research that finds that medium value transactions are relatively 
more informative than large value ones, possibly because informed traders 
attempt to conceal their information by trading smaller blocks of shares. 
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Alternatively, we suggest that small revenue-generating transactions are 
essentially discretionary, and therefore may provide more information to 
outside investors.  
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Table 1 Summary Statistics - UK Executive Stock Option Exercises 
1992 - 1998 
 No. of 
Exercises 
No. of Firms No. of Event 
Days 
Mkt. Cap. 
(£m) 
Mean 
Revenue or 
Investment 
      
All 5779 899 1497 2654  
      
Revenue 2731 618 1109 2987 185,004 
      
Invest 3048 727 1208 2355 53,432 
      
 
All represents the complete sample of exercises that take place between January 1992 and 
July 1998 for which we have the associated data on returns and exercise price. Revenue are 
those transactions that generate net revenue for the executive, whilst Invest are those 
transactions that require the executive to make a net investment in the stock. No. of firms is 
the number of firms for which there is at least one option exercise in the respective 
categories. No. of Event Days is the number of days on which at least one exercise occurs. 
Mkt. Cap. is the mean market capitalisation of the firm at the time of exercise. Mean Revenue 
or Investment is the average revenue or investment for the two types of transaction. 
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Table 2 Abnormal Returns Associated with Investment Requiring 
Option Exercises  
Stock Option Exercises January 1992 – July 1998 
 -1 month +1 month +2 months +3 months +6 months 
      
Invest 0.76 0.29 0.32 0.14 -0.00 
All [3.04] [1.20] [1.14] [0.39] [-0.01] 
      
Invest -0.06 0.21 0.62 0.28 -0.95 
Small [-1.68] [0.56] [1.28] [0.44] [-1.05] 
      
Invest 1.09 -0.13 0.16 -0.07 0.60 
Medium [3.23] [-0.42] [0.48] [-0.16] [0.87] 
      
Invest 1.32 0.23 -0.51 -0.32 -0.24 
Large [2.88] [0.46] [-0.94] [-0.49] [-0.23] 
      
 
Invest represents the mean percentage abnormal returns associated with exercises that 
require a net investment. Small represents net transactions with a value below £5000, 
Medium represents net transactions with a value between £5,000 - £70,000 and Large 
represents net transactions with a value over £70,000. Thus Invest (Small) represents the 
abnormal return for exercises where the combined cost of exercising and associated sale of 
stock require the executive to make an effective net investment of less than £5,000. Mean 
percentage abnormal returns are measured over the respective windows using a calendar 
time methodology. Calendar day abnormal returns are the mean abnormal returns to all those 
firms that have an event such that they lie within the particular window on that day. A firm’s 
abnormal return each day is that firm’s return minus the firm’s respective size/momentum 
portfolio return. The corresponding t-statistics, measuring significance from zero, are in 
brackets. 
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Table 3 Abnormal Returns Associated with Revenue Generating 
Option Exercises  
Stock Option Exercises January 1992 – July 1998 
 -1 month +1 month +2 months +3 months +6 months 
      
Revenue 2.53 -0.63 -1.03 -1.51 -1.96 
All [11.17] [-2.41] [-2.96] [-3.36] [-2.54] 
      
Revenue 2.59 -1.06 -1.30 -2.57 -4.39 
Small [3.51] [-2.06] [-1.83] [-2.92] [-3.01] 
      
Revenue 2.74 -1.42 -1.90 -2.40 -3.13 
Medium [8.82] [-4.74] [-4.80] [-4.91] [-4.05] 
      
Revenue 2.54 -0.29 -0.55 -1.09 -0.96 
Large [9.24] [-0.89] [-1.34] [-1.88] [-1.16] 
      
 
Revenue represents the mean percentage abnormal returns associated with exercises that 
yield a net income. Small represents net transactions with a value below £5000, Medium 
represents net transactions with a value between £5,000 - £70,000 and Large represents net 
transactions with a value over £70,000. Thus Revenue (Small) represents the abnormal 
return for exercises where the combined cost of exercising and associated sale of stock yields 
the executive an effective net revenue of less than £5,000. Mean percentage abnormal 
returns are measured over the respective windows using a calendar time methodology. 
Calendar day abnormal returns are the mean abnormal returns to all those firms that have an 
event such that they lie within the particular window on that day. A firm’s abnormal return 
each day is that firm’s return minus the firm’s respective size/momentum portfolio return. The 
corresponding t-statistics, measuring significance from zero, are in brackets. 
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Table 4 Abnormal Returns Associated with Investment Requiring 
Option Exercises Relative to the Firm’s Market Capitalisation 
Stock Option Exercises January 1992 – July 1998 
 -1 month +1 month +2 months +3 months +6 months 
      
Invest 0.76 0.29 0.32 0.14 -0.00 
All [3.04] [1.20] [1.14] [0.39] [-0.01] 
      
Invest 0.02 -0.08 -0.10 -0.32 -0.71 
Small [0.05] [-0.29] [-0.38] [-0.60] [-0.52] 
      
Invest 0.61 -0.43 -0.60 -0.89 -1.59 
Medium [2.00] [-1.50] [-1.22] [-1.77] [-1.36] 
      
Invest 1.36 1.17 1.09 1.06 2.15 
Large [2.59] [3.44] [1.87] [2.00] [1.12] 
      
 
Invest represents the mean percentage abnormal returns associated with exercises that 
require a net investment. A sort of net investment relative to the firm’s market capitalisation 
yields the Small, Medium and Large subdivisions respectively. Mean percentage abnormal 
returns are measured over the respective windows using a calendar time methodology. 
Calendar day abnormal returns are the mean abnormal returns to all those firms that have an 
event such that they lie within the particular window on that day. A firm’s abnormal return 
each day is that firm’s return minus the firm’s respective size/momentum portfolio return. The 
corresponding t-statistics, measuring significance from zero, are in brackets. 
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Table 5 Abnormal Returns Associated with Revenue Generating 
Option Exercises Relative to the Firm’s Market Capitalisation 
Stock Option Exercises January 1992 – July 1998 
 -1 month +1 month +2 months +3 months +6 months 
      
Revenue 2.53 -0.63 -1.03 -1.51 -1.96 
All [11.17] [-2.41] [-2.96] [-3.36] [-2.54] 
      
Revenue 1.78 -0.65 -2.00 -2.98 -2.88 
Small [5.95] [-2.02] [-3.97] [-5.11] [- 2.06] 
      
Revenue 2.13 -0.13 -0.72 -1.29 -1.48 
Medium [7.42] [-0.31] [-1.53] [-2.34] [-1.07] 
      
Revenue 3.79 -0.41 -0.59 -0.71 -1.56 
Large [10.01] [-1.49] [-0.97] [-1.01] [-1.03] 
      
 
Revenue represents the mean percentage abnormal returns associated with exercises that 
require a net investment. A sort of net investment relative to the firm’s market capitalisation 
yields the Small, Medium and Large subdivisions respectively. Mean percentage abnormal 
returns are measured over the respective windows using a calendar time methodology. 
Calendar day abnormal returns are the mean abnormal returns to all those firms that have an 
event such that they lie within the particular window on that day. A firm’s abnormal return 
each day is that firm’s return minus the firm’s respective size/momentum portfolio return. The 
corresponding t-statistics, measuring significance from zero, are in brackets. 
 
 
